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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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vs.
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Case No. 17082

BRIEF OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action filed by plaintiff, George

o.

Bishop,

Jr., against defendant, Charles Hollis Nielsen, for property
damage incurred to plaintiff's vehicle in an automobile accident.
Defendant filed a third-party complaint against the driver of
plaintiff's vehicle, Genice Gay Bishop, for damage incurred by
defendant's vehicle and for contribution upon plaintiff's cause
of action against defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff, George

o.

Bishop, Jr., and third-party

defendant, Genice Gay Bishop, originally filed a motion for a
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partial summary judgment to dismiss the contribution claim
against third-party defendant, by reason of the fact that Genice
Gay Bishop cannot be a joint tort feasor with the defendant.

The

motion was denied by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on August
13, 1979.
The trial of the above-captioned matter was held, and
third-party defendant, Genice Gay Bishop, made a motion for a
directed verdict to dismiss the contribution action against her
on the same grounds that were urged at the motion for partial
summary judgment.

The motion for a directed verdict was denied,

by the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, during the course of the trial,
and the jury was presented with a "Special Verdict" to answer
interrogatories concerning the negligence and liability of
defendant, Charles Hollis Nielsen, and third-party defendant,
Genice Gay Bishop.
The jury apportioned negligence of 70% to defendant and
30% to third-party defendant, Genice Gay Bishop.

Judgment was

rendered pursuant to the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff,
George

o.

Bishop, Jr., against defendant, Charles Hollis Nielsen,

for 100% of plaintiff's damages, $664.97, and a judgment was also
rendered in favor of defendant, Charles Hollis Nielsen, againt
third-party defendant, Genice Gay Bishop, for $199.49, representing 30% of the total damages incurred by plaintff, George
Bishop, Jr.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Third-party defendant, Genice Gay Bishop seeks to have
the judgment rendered against her in contribution overturned, and
to have the order denying the motion for a directed verdict
reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 15, 1977, the third-party defendant, Genice Gay
Bishop, was involved in an automobile accident with the
defendant, Charles Nielsen.

(R. 15, 142, 368)

At the time of

the accident, the third-party defendant was driving an automobile
which belonged to her father, the plaintiff.

(R. 362, 368, 394)

In May of 1978, George Bishop instituted an action against the
defendant to recover for the damages his automobile sustained in
the accident.

(R. 15, 362, 393)

The defendant filed a third-

party complaint against the third-party defendant for
contribution.

(R. 15, 363, 393)

The third-party defendant was born on June 30, 1960.
(R. 108, 368)

On July 15, 1977, the date of the accident, she

was 17 years old. (R. 368, 394)

She was single and lived at home

with her parents, Mr. and Mrs. George O. Bishop, who were her
sole means of support.

(R. 106, 108, 362, 368, 394)

Plaintiff, George

o.

Bishop, Jr., and third-party

defendant, Genice Gay Bishop, filed a motion for a partial summary judgment to dismiss the contribution claim filed by defendant on the basis that the third-party defendant was the uneman-

-3-
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cipated minor child of the plaintiff at the time of the automobile accident and therefore cannot be a joint tort feasor responsible for her father's damage, on the basis of the intra-family
immunity doctrine.

The motion for partial summary judgment was

denied on August 13, 1979.

(R. 244-245)

A notice of intent to

appeal the denial of the motion for partial summary judgment was
filed on

August 13, 1979.

(R.

246-247)

At the trial of the lawsuit, plaintiff and third-party
defendant moved the court for a directed verdict in favor of
third-party defendant upon the third-party complaint again urging
the court that a contribution action against the third-party
defendant was improper because of the "intra-family immunity
doctrine.

The court denied the motion on the basis that the

denial of the partial summary judgment by Judge Wilkinson became
the law of the case.

(R. 400)

The jury was submitted the case on a "Special Verdict"
and apportioned negligence in the amount of 70% against
defendant, Charles Hollis Nielsen, and 30% against third-party
defendant, Genice Gay Bishop.
ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE UTAH COURTS HAVE IMPLICITLY ADOPTED
THE INTRA-FAMILY IMMUNITY DOCTRINE.
The intra-family immunity doctrine provides that a
parent cannot sue his or her unemancipated child in tort.

The

doctrine first emerged in the American judicial system in 1891,

-4-
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with Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1981).

In that

case a minor child brought an action against her mother for false
imprisonment.

The Mississippi court promulgated a rule denying a

minor child the right to sue his parents for personal tort.

The

court said:
The peace of society, and the families
composing society, and a sound public
policy, designed to subserve the repose
of families and the best interests of
society, forbid to the minor child the
right to appear in court in the assertion
of a claim to civil redress for personal
injuries suffered at the hands of the
parent. Id. at 887.
Courts upholding the intra-family immunity doctrine have
rationalized it on three grounds; danger of fraud or collusion,
preservation of family tranquility and parental discipline, and
compliance with the intra-spousal immunity doctrine.

The Iowa

Supreme Court recently upheld the family immunity doctrine
reasoning:
We believe that the family unit, which is
basic to all cultures and societies, and
vitally important to ours, should not
include in its internal structure a concept of recompensable fault in cases of
ordinary negligence involving the family
relationship. Moreover, we are satisfied
that the arguments advanced for the
rejection of the family immunity doctrine
are fundamentally unsound, are utterly
and completely repugnant and foreign to a
harmonious family relationship, and feel
they erroneously attempt to equate all
human behavior in mere monetary values.
Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W.2d 105, 109,
(Iowa, 1968).
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In Nahas v. Noble, 420 P.2d 127 (N.M. 1966), the Supreme
Court of New Mexico upheld the family immunity doctrine and
dismissed the plaintiff's mother's action against her daughter,
even though the daughter had been emancipated subsequent to the
injury but prior to the commencement of the action.
tiff had been injured in an automobile accident.

The plain-

At the time of

the accident, the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile
driven by her daughter.

With reference to the fact that the

child was not liable to her mother, the court stated:
Suits by a parent against the child tend
to disrupt the family relationship
because of the antagonism implicit in
such suits. There is an inconsistency
between the parent's position as the
natural guardian of the child and the
parent's position as plaintiff demanding
damages from the child. • • It is
repugnant to the prevailing sense of
propriety that a mother should bring an
action at law against her own minor
child. [Citations omitted]
Encouragement of family unity and the
maintenance of family discipline being
sound public policy, we hold that a
parent cannot maintain an action in
negligence against an unemancipated minor
child. Id. at 128.
The court went on to hold that an action could not be brought by
a parent against his or her child if the child was an unemancipated minor child at the time of the accident, even though the
child had been emancipated prior to the trial.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has never dealt with the
question of intra-family immunity, they did uphold the intraspousal immunity doctrine in Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d

-6-
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344, 384 P.2d 389 (Utah, 1963).

In that case a wife sued the

estate of her husband for injuries she received in an automobiletrain accident.

Her husband was the driver, and she was a

passenger in the automobile.

The Utah Supreme Court held that a

wife cannot maintain a tort action against her husband.

The

court based their decision on the need for protecting family
solidarity.

They also noted that where insurance is involved,

the spouses would have a common interest in the outcome, thus
encouraging collusion.

The court said:

It has always been the law of our state,
insofar as we have been able to
ascertain, that a suit of this character
could not be maintained. It is inevitable that this has been assumed to be
the law. • • We are of the opinion that
under these circumstances in fairness to
those who have relied thereon, and in
proper deference to the solidarity of
the law, any change could be justified
only to correct patent error, otherwise
it should be made by the legislature,
plainly so declaring, so that all may be
advised what the change is and wnen it
will be effective. Id. at 393.
In two subsequent cases, the Utah Supreme Court continued to uphold the doctrine of intra-spousal immunity.

In

Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (Utah, 1974), the court upheld the
Utah's guest statute upon the rationale of preventing collusive
actions.

The court refused to follow the California decision

which had overruled the guest statute, and the intra-family and
the intra-spousal immunity doctrine on the ground that the possibility of collusive actions was not sufficient justification for
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the doctrine.

The Utah court reiterated its belief that the

legislature, and not the court, was the proper forum for changing
such rules.

In 1978, the court again upheld the intra-spousal

immunity doctrine in Hull v. Silver, 577 P.2d 103 (Utah, 1978).
The courts that have abrogated intra-family immunity
have rationalized their decisions on the grounds that the injury
has already been sustained and therefore family harmony has been
disturbed.

Furthermore, because most families are covered by

insurance, the real parties in the action are the insurance
companies, not the family members.

Tamashiro v. De Gama, 450

P.2d 998 (Hawaii, 1969).

The Utah Supreme Court has expressly

rejected this reasoning.

In Rubalcava v. Gisseman, the court

rebutted the insurance argument saying:
The question of liability can be ascertained justly only upon its own merits.
Whether there is insurance or not is
immaterial to this determination.
However, the fact cannot be ignored that
where there is insurance, and this is
known to both parties, the temptation to
collusion exists; and this is increased
when the supposedly adverse parties are
in the symbiotic relationship of husband
and wife. The risk of loss, and the
natural reaction to defend against a
charge of wrong, may be negligible or
non-existent; and are supplanted by the
covert hope of mutual benefit. Id. at
391.
(Emphasis added)
The court also upheld the family harmony argument,
noting that such an action would "weaken the foundation of [the]
relationship because when troubles arise

-8-
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•

• the parties would
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then suspect each other's integrity."

Id. at 392.

The rationale the Utah Supreme Court has relied upon in
upholding the intra-spousal immunity doctrine is equally applicable to the intra-family immunity doctrine.

The need to main-

tain family harmony and to protect against collusive actions
between parent and child dictate a need for the intra-family
immunity doctrine.

As the court has noted on two occasions, if

the doctrine is to be abrogated, the proper forum for such a
change is the legislature, not the court.
supra; Cannon v. Oviatt, supra.

Rubalcava v. Gisseman,

Thus, it is clear that the Utah

, Supreme Court has strongly upheld the rationale behind the intraspousal and intra-family immunity docrines.
There is no dispute that on the day of the automobile
accident involved in this matter, the third-party defendant,
Genice Gay Bishop, was 17 years old, (R. 368, 394), and was
single and living at home with her parents, Mr. and Mrs. George

o.

Bishop, who were her sole means of support.

362, 368, 394)

(R. 106, 108,

The intra-family immunity doctrine that has at

least been implicitly adopted by the Utah Supreme Court would
prevent an action by plaintiff, George

o.

Bishop, Jr., against

his unemancipated minor child, Genice Gay Bishop, for the damages
incurred to plaintiff's vehicle as a result of any negligence of
his daughter.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A
JUDGMENT FOR CONTRIBUTION AGAINST THE
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT IS NOT A JOINT TORT
FEASOR.

In granting a judgment for contribution against the
third-party defendant, the trial court committed error in either
failing to affirm and recognize the intra-family immunity
doctrine as in existence in the State of Utah, or in failing to
apply the doctrine to a contribution cause of action.
Under Utah law, the right to contribution exists only
against one who is "jointly or severally liable in tort for the
same injury."

U.C.A. 78-27-40(3) (1973).

This statute provides

that, "The right of contribution shall exist upon joint tort
feasors ••

.

'

n

U.C.A. 78-27-39 (1973), and defines a joint tort

feasor as:
One of two or more persons jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same
injury to person or property, whether or
not a judgment has been recovered against
all or some of them. U.C.A. §78-27-40(3)
(1973).
Under this statute, therefore, though a person has been
negligent with reference to a particular injury, he will not be
liable for contribution to that injury where he is not liable for
that injury himself.

Thus, Genice Bishop cannot be liable to her

father, as a third-party defendant, because he could not sue
Genice under the intra-family immunity doctrine.
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the contribution

-10-
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statute in Curtis v. Harmon Electronic Co., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah,
1976).

In that case, a passenger was injured when the car he was

riding in collided with a railroad car.

The car was driven by a

co-worker who was acting in the course of his employment.

The

passenger recovered from his employer's Workmen's Compensation
insurance.

He then brought an action against the railroad for

negligence.

The railroad tried to join the passenger's employer

on a joint tort feasor and contribution theory.

The court held

that the employee's only remedy against his employer was under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, and therefore the employer could
not be a "tort feasor" and could not be liable for contribution
under Utah's contribution statute.
Following this same reasoning, several courts have held
that a party who is not liable to the plaintiff due to the intrafamily immunity doctrine, will not be liable to the defendant for
contribution.

In Faul v. Dennis, 118 N.J.Supr. 338, 287 A.2d 470

(N.J. 1972), the plaintiff, an unemancipated minor child, was
injured while a passenger in a car driven by his mother.

The

plaintiff sued the other driver involved in the collision, who
brought in the mother as a third-party defendant for
contribution.

The New Jersey court stated:
Since the infant plaintiff lacks a cause
of action due to the immunity of the
parent, no claim for contribution may be
made against defendant (mother) by the
other defendants who are liable for the
infant's injuries. Id. at 473.
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Similarly, in American

Auto Ins. co. v. Malling, 57

N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1953), defendant was involved in a collision in
which his wife was injured.

The wife brought an action against

the other driver for personal injuries and recovered.

The other

driver's insurance then sued the defendant for contribution.

The

court held that the husband was not a joint tort feasor under the
intra-spousal immunity doctrine and thus was not liable for
contribution.

The court said:
While the present action is not by the
wife against the husband but is brought
against the husband by the subrogee of
the joint tort feasor, nevertheless the
immunity of the husband from liability to
his wife does destroy a necessary element
of the action for contribution, and,
consequently, is a good defense to such
an action. Id. at 849.

This principle was reaffirmed by that court in Nelson v. Home
Decorating Co. v. Nelson, 109 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1961).
Thus it is clear that where the intra-family immunity
doctrine bars a party from liability for an injury, that party
will not be liable for contribution for that injury.

The fact

that the parties are generally covered by liability insurance
also militates against allowing an action for contribution
against a family member.
The presence of liability insurance in
such instances may lead to fraud, or at
least collusive, or at best friendly
suits, the parent may encourage his minor
child to bring such an action against
him. This is not a far fetched
possibility. Not only is it contrary to
good faith, but it also has the tendency

-12-
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of promoting cyn1c1sm and lack of
integrity • • • [which] the law should
not encourage. Dennis v. Walker, 284
F.Supp. 413, 417 (1968).
Utah has recognized and affirmed the intra-spousal
immunity doctrine, Rubalcava v. Gisseman, and by doing so, the
Utah Supreme Court has indirectly approved of the intra-family
immunity doctrine.

Consequently, Genice Bishop cannot be liable

to her father for the damages his automobile sustained in the
accident.

Since Utah law only recognizes an action for contribu-

tion among joint tort feasors, Genice Bishop cannot be liable in
contribution to Charles Nielsen, and the lower court committed
error in denying third-party defendant's motion for directed verdiet and in entering a judgment aginst her upon the contribution
cause of action.
CONCLUSION
In the present case, the plaintiff, George Bishop,
brought an action to recover for damages his automobile sustained
in an accident between his daughter and the defendant.

The

plaintiff's minor daughter was driving his automobile at the time
of the accident.

The defendant, Charles Nielsen, alleged that

plaintiff's daughter should be liable to him for contribution.
Since the third-party defendant cannot be liable to her father due
to the intra-family immunity doctrine, she cannot be liable to
the defendant, Charles Nielsen.

Under the Utah contribution

statute, it is evident that a party will not be liable for
contribution if he is not jointly and severally liable with the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

defendant for the plaintiff's injuries.

Therefore, where the

party from whom contribution is sought is not jointly and
severally liable, due to the intra-family immunity doctrine,
there can be no action for contribution.

Genice Bishop,

therefore, is not liable for the injury the plaintiff sustained
and cannot be jointly and severally liable with the defendant for
that injury.

Third-party defendant respectfully requests that

the judgment against her for contribution be overturned •
. Respectfully submitted this

...?~of

August, 1980.

STRONG & HANNI

ByG:

' R. Scott Williams

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
and Third-Party Defendant-Appellant
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of August, 1980,
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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